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Missed Opportunities: California
Energy Fears, New York Energy Policy
and the New York Power Authority's
New York City Turbine Projects
JOHN L. PARKER
JAMES MALATRAS*

I.

Introduction

Energy policy is at a crossroads in New York State. New York
State Energy Law requires the New York State Energy Planning
Board to develop a statewide energy plan every four years and the
next plan will be finalized in the spring of 2002.1 New York's primary law dealing with electric power plant siting, Article X of the
Public Service Law, will sunset on January 1, 2003.2 The federally initiated era of deregulation of the early 1990's has posed
multifarious environmental, economic, and health problems that
states, like New York, have been left to come to grips with and,
although the state has made several attempts to work within the
landscape of deregulation, it has yet to prove successful. 3 With
*

John L. Parker J.D., 1996 Pace University School of Law. Counsel to Assem-

blyman Richard Brodsky, Chairman of the New York State Assembly Committee on
Corporations, Authorities and Commissions. James Malatras, Doctoral Candidate in
Political Science, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy. Policy Analyst to
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky. Special thanks to Fred Zalcman, Executive Director
of the Pace Law School Energy Law Project for his support.
1. See NEW YORK STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, NEW
YORK STATE ENERGY PLAN - JUNE 2002, at http://www.nyserda.org/sep.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
2. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 160-72 (McKinney 2002) (noting each statute to
be effective until January 1, 2003). The authors would like to note that this article
was completed in December of 2001 and was intended to offer a contemporaneous look
at the New York State energy issues it addresses. Many of the issues remain unsettled, and Article X of the Public Service Law has sunset.
3. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (proposed May 10, 1996) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385) (calling for the opening of wholesale power
sales to competition); Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly RealTime Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (proposed May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt 37) (ensuring that transmission
owners do not have an unfair advantage in using transmission to sell power).
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the expiration of two critical energy policies and the continued
problems of energy deregulation, New York enters a decisive period of how to correct the ills of irrational energy policy.
Last year, actions by several state agencies have demonstrated the need for improved energy policy. Forecasts have predicted an electricity shortage in the future, but as we will
illustrate, it is not the ominous portent the state is portraying.
Since September of 2000, the Department of Public Service
("DPS"), the Power Authority of the State of New York ("PASNY"),
the Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") and New
York Independent System Operator ("ISO") forecasted Californiastyle blackouts for the summer of 2001. These agencies have perpetuated fears that New York will be the next California, and in
response have made a series of questionable legal moves which
may have a detrimental effect on the environment and health of
the state. We will illustrate that Article X, as well as the current
State energy system of production and distribution, is seriously
flawed and that deregulation has not been good for the consumer
4
or the environment.
Recent developments illustrated a number of decisions to
build new power plants and restart older power plants without
following state environmental laws. We shall focus on one example, the State's decision to install 10 generators in the New York
City area, and illustrate how the State's accelerated siting process
subverted environmental laws because of preexisting flaws within
the state energy market.
By focusing on one example, it will be shown that this new
system has brought New York to its current situation-the building of numerous plants without a comprehensive or rational energy plan, and a push for distributed generators, increasing
pollution of the State's air, water, and other natural resources,
such as approving the Athens power plant in the historically rich
and natural landscape of the Mid-Hudson Valley. The decision to
build these generators in New York City in 2001 has set the precedent for use of this strategy elsewhere, raises environmental justice concerns, and illustrates the current shortsighted approach of
New York's energy policy.

4. In California, deregulation became so unpopular that the California Energy
Commission Internet Homepage once provided a whole section of how consumers
could file a complaint "about [their] Bills or Deregulation."
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Power Authority of the State of New York's Siting of
Electric Turbines In New York City: Legal and
Policy Issues

In August of 2000 PASNY sited 10 gas turbines in various
locations around New York City for the explicit purpose of closing
"the anticipated gap in electrical generating capacity and [to] ensure the reliability of the New York City metropolitan area's electric system."5 According to PASNY, "the Department of Public
Service informed PASNY that immediate action is needed to assure adequate electrical supply next summer, and to help protect
and preserve human life, health, property, and natural resources." 6 PASNY claimed that in response to this request, the
"NYPA Trustees on August 29, 2000 approved a resolution to
7
purchase up to eleven" gas turbines.
PASNY's description shows the expedited nature of the process that was followed to install the gas turbines. In a letter dated
October 12, 2000, DPS indicated to PASNY that there was the
need for an additional 315 MW of generating capacity in New
York City.8 The letter, identifying the need for additional generating capacity, was dated over one month after PASNY approved
the resolution to purchase the gas turbines raising questions. The
authorization to purchase before the statement of need was received raises questions about process the agency followed for its
determination of need. The October 12, 2000 letter also raised
questions about PASNY's assertion that the turbine purchase was
in response to the Public Service Commission ("PSC") request.
PASNY installed General Electric LM 6000 simple-cycle gas
turbines, each of which is essentially a jet engine housed in a modular unit, that are coupled with air-cooled electric generators.9
The gas turbines "can provide a constant power output of 47 MW
at ambient temperatures up to 100' F, of which 3 MW are required for onsite operations and 44 MW are available for distribution on the electrical grid."10 The maximum capacity for the dual
5. NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FORM FOR SITE
SELECTION AND INSTALLATION OF TEN NATURAL GAS TURBINE GENERATORS IN NEW
YORK CITY AND LONG ISLAND A-2 (2000) [hereinafter PASNY EAF].
6. PASNY EAF, supra note 6, at A-3.
7. Id.
8. Letter from Howard Tarler, Chief, Bulk Transmissions System for the Public
Service Commission, to Robert Hiney, Executive Vice President-Project Operations,
New York Power Authority 1 (Oct. 12, 2000).
9. PASNY EAF, supra note 6, at A-3.
10. Id. at S-14.
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gas turbine site would be 94 MW, with a net output of 88 MW of
electricity to the grid. The number of gas turbines installed and
the chosen sites included:
Sunset Park, Brooklyn:
Williamsburg, Brooklyn:
Long Island City, Queens:
South Bronx:
South Bronx:
Brentwood, Long Island:

23rd and 3rd Avenues - 2 turbines
North 1st Street and River Street 1 turbine
42 - 30 Vernon Blvd. - 2 turbines
Harlem River Rail Yards at East
132nd Street - 2 turbines
East 132nd to East 134thStreet,
Locust Avenue - 2 turbines
Pilgrim State Hospital, Islip 11
1 turbine.

State Law requires an environmental review when a new
power plant is sited. The review may be conducted pursuant to
either Article X of the Public Service Law ("PSL"), or to the State
Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), depending upon
the plant's generating capacity. 12 In this case, PASNY concluded
that Article X did not apply; a decision by the Siting Board confirmed their interpretation, and concluded that no environmental
impact statement was required under SEQRA because the project
had no "significant" adverse environmental impact.
A. PSL Article X Review
Article X of the PSL sets forth a process for the siting of major
electric generating facilities. The statute applies to electric generating facilities with "a generating capacity of eighty thousand
kilowatts or more.' 13 The Electric Generating Facility Siting
14
Board ("Siting Board") oversees the Article X review process.
The review concludes when the Siting Board decides whether to
11. Id. at A-3. As will be discussed, the locations of the turbines are critical in
understanding the problems with the current state of energy policy in New York.
12. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney 2002); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW
§ 164 (McKinney 2002) (outlining application requirements); N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw
§ 160(2) (McKinney 2002) (defining "[miajor electric generating facility" as facility
with generating capacity of greater than 80,000 kilowatts).
13. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 160(2).
14. The seven member Siting Board consists of the Commissioners of the Department of Public Service ("DPS"), Environmental Conservation, Health, State Energy
Office, Economic Development, and two ad-hoc members. The Commissioner of the
DPS chairs the Siting Board. Id. § 160(4).
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issue a "certificate of environmental compatibility and public
need" which is required for operation. 15 There was no question
that Article X did not apply to the proposed sites that had one gas
turbine capable of producing 47 MW at maximum capacity. The
Siting Board agreed that under that condition, Article X would not
apply to the dual turbine sites. On October 31, 2000, PASNY
sought a declaratory ruling from the Siting Board that Article X
did not apply to the siting of four sites that had two turbine generating facilities. 16 In the petition to the Siting Board, PASNY
agreed to a "legally binding commitment" that the units will not
17
operate at or above 80 MW.
For many, the Siting Board's decision raised more questions
than it answered. On its face, the Siting Board's decision allowed
the dual turbine facilities to generate 85.9 MW in direct violation
of the 80MW threshold language found in Article X.18 Many argued that the decision was contrary to the statutory language and
therefore illegal. Two separate lawsuits were brought, but the
courts did not reach the 80 MW question.' 9 Under the statutory
language, a "'major electric generating facility' means an electric
generating facility with a generating capacity of eighty thousand
kilowatts or more." 20 The Siting Board concluded that if a "legally
binding commitment" is made the "units will not be operated at a
total net generating capacity of 80 MW or more," then "the generating facility so constructed and so operated will not be a major
electric generating facility," and therefore, not subject to Article
X.21 The Siting Board's decision cleverly added the term "net" to
the statutory "generating capacity" language, which can be read
15. Id. § 160(6). See also N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 162(1), 168, & 169 (describing
the certification requirements).
16. See Petition by the Power Auth. of New York for a Declaratory Ruling that a
Bd.Certificate is Not Required for Combinations at a Site of Generators that Shall Be
Operated at a Combined Wattage of Less than Eighty Thousand Kilowatts, Declaratory Ruling Concerning Standard for Defining Generating Capacity, N.Y.S. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Bd. on Elec. Generation Siting & the Env't, 2000 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 911, *1
(No. 00-F-1934) (Nov. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Siting Board Decision].
17. Id.
18. Id. at *1-2.
19. See generally UPROSE v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div. 2001); Silvercup Studios, Inc. v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 2001) (finding in UPROSE that it was sufficient to prepare an environmental assessment form whereby
the Power Authority promised they would not exceed the 80 MW capacity, while Silvercup Studios focused on the importance and necessity of an Environmental Impact
Statement).
20. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 160(2) (McKinney 2002).
21. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *13-14 (emphasis added).

5

432

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

as effectively allowing an 85.9 MW generating capacity for each
double turbine site. Net capacity is gross MW capacity minus operational MW which equals net operational MW. In this case, the
"net"calculation allows actual generation of 85.9 MW, or 79.9 MW
plus 6 MW to operate the two units.
The Siting Board concluded that the statute left the "nature
of the 80,000-kilowatt test for exemptions to the discretion of the
Chairman of the Board." 2 2 The Siting Board's analysis focused on
whether the Legislature intended "generating capacity" to mean
"a design standard" or "an operational standard." 23 The Siting
Board reasoned that an operational standard "is logical because
whether one is concerned with the environment, the consumer, or
both, a plant's actual generation is much more significant than its
theoretical capacity. ' 24 The Siting Board's reasoning is in response to arguments by various petitioners that Article X should
apply in this case because two generating facilities have a "name25
plate rating of 94 MW and a net capacity of 88MW."
The Siting Board reasoned, "[blecause an exemption based on
a plant's actual operation, as opposed to its nameplate capacity, is
not only consistent with Article X's legislative history, but a more
accurate gauge of a project's potential environmental impact, the
operational standard is a more realistic method for deciding which
projects must follow Article X."26 The Siting Board relied upon
"legislative intent" specifically referred to in a Division of Budget
22. Id. at *10.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *8. While the Article X statutory language explicitly includes exemptions from its provisions, it does not include an exemption for 'operational restrictions'
as suggested by the Siting Board. Exemptions from Article X include: (a) facilities
that applied for a permit within 180 days of signing into law or if under construction,
(b) facilities over which the federal government exercises exclusive jurisdiction, (c)
facilities under repairs that do not "result in an increase in capacity of the facility of
more than fifty thousand kilowatts," (d) facilities constructed on lands dedicated to
industrial uses and generating capacity for such premises does not exceed 200,000
kilowatts, or (e) facilities generating electricity from combustion of solid waste. N.Y.
PUB. SERv. LAW § 162(4)(a)-(e).

25. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *5. The petitioning parties were,
"Citizens United for Responsible Energy (CURE), Environmental Advocates (EA),
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), New York Institute of Legal Research
(NYILR), New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, Inc. (NYLPI), New York Public
Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), Southern Energy Bowline, L.L.C; Southern Energy Lovett, L.L.C.; and Southern Energy NYGen, L.L.C. (the Southern parties)." Id.
at *4 n.2.
26. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
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report to support its position.27 The memo, from an Executive
branch agency, characterized the bill as applying on a "mandatory
basis" to "'a facility... that produces eighty thousand kilowatts or
more.'"28 The language relies on the term 'produces' for the proposition that an "operational" capacity is what the legislature intended. The Siting Board concluded "[wihile the legislative
history does not expressly spell out the purpose of the 80,000-kilowatt cutoff, it suggests that the 80,000-kilowatt standard should
be based on a plant's actual production, rather than its nameplate. '29 The Siting Board does not explain how the word "produces" in a Department of Budget memo, with no other reference
to any other document in the Legislative record justifies its legal
interpretation. In light of the plain language of the statute, the
legal reasoning appears dubious at best, but the Department of
Budget memo provides tenuous authority to allow the Board to
conclude that the legislature intended an actual production definition versus a nameplate capacity definition.
27. Id. at *9 n.4; see also 1992 N.Y. Laws 1471. Only two of the sixteen memos in
the S. 4912-A bill jacket reviewed by the authors use the word "produces" when discussing the 80 MW threshold requirement of the statute. Two memoranda state "produces." One states, "[a] new article of the Public Service Law reestablishes a
certification process for the siting of new electric generating facilities producing 80
MW or more." Memorandum from William E. Davis, Senior Vice President, Niagara
Mohawk Power Corporation, to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 21,
1992), reprinted in Bill Jacket 1992 ch. 519, S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992). The other states,
"[diefinition of'major electric generating facility' has been revised from a facility that
produces fifty thousand kilowatts or more to one that produces eighty thousand kilowatts or more." Memorandum, Budget Report on 10 Day Bills (July 9, 1992), reprinted in Bill Jacket 1992 ch. 519, S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992). Other memoranda in the
bill jacket do not state "produce," but rather refer to "capacity." See Memorandum
from Howard A. Fromer, General Counsel, N.Y.S. Energy Office, to Elizabeth D.
Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 14, 1992), reprintedin Bill Jacket 1992 ch. 519,
S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992) (stating "[tihe new siting provision . . . would apply to both
steam and non-steam facilities with generating capacities of 80 MW or more."); Memorandum from Stanley B. Klimberg, General Counsel, Long Island Power Authority,
to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 8, 1992), reprinted in Bill
Jacket 1992 ch. 519, S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992) (stating "[iun addition, the new Article X
provisions would apply to both steam and non-steam facilities ... with a generating
capacity of 80 megawatts or more."); Memorandum from Langdon Marsh, Executive
Department Commissioner, N.Y.S. Department of Environmental Conservation, to
Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 16, 1992), reprinted in Bill Jacket
1992 ch. 519, S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992) (stating "[tihey extend to all major electric generating facilities, as opposed to all major steam electric facilities, with a threshold of 80
MW.").
28. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *9 n.4 (citing "the Budget Report on
10 Day Bills for $4912A, which describes the definition of 'major electric generating
facility.'").
29. Id. at *8.
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B. The Siting Board's Decision Sets a Precedent for Energy
Policy in New York that May Compromise Public Health
Protections
The precedent set by the PASNY petition is far reaching. In
December 2000, the PSC asked that utilities "consider identifying
appropriate sites for small-scale generation (less than 80MW) and
provide information regarding small-scale generation units that
they expect to be installed in the near future."30 The PSC's call for
additional sites also became a de facto energy policy of the state,
particularly in the New York City metro area and on Long Island,
due to electrical infrastructure issues, such as transmission of
electricity to these regions.
Under the Siting Board's decision, government or private entities can effectively bypass the procedural safeguards and environmental review afforded by Article X. Other power plant
operators were quick to exploit PASNY's approach. In mid-2001,
the Long Island Power Authority ("LIPA") proposed an almost
identical plan to use turbines on Long Island. 31 LIPA proposed
"10 new mini-plants" (the same General Electric LM 6000 models
used by the PASNY) to avoid potential energy shortfalls in the
summer of 2002.32 Calling the mini-plants "peaking stations,"

LIPA argues that they will be used only when demand is high and
energy supply is low. Turbines that will be placed in Port Jefferson, Glenwood Landing, Shoreham and Brentwood have each been
earmarked to produce only 79.9 MW, and are therefore not subject
to Article X. 33 On November 13, 2001, LIPA approved the Environmental Assessment ("EA") under SEQRA and issued a nega30. In re a Status Report on the Demand/Supply Component of the Department's
Electric Price and Reliability Task Force Including Recommendations for Specific
Utility Actions on the Demand-Side, Order Requiring Filings and Reports on Utility
Demand Response Programs, N.Y.S. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 00-E-2054 (Dec. 20,
2000), 2000 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 1041, at *5.
31. See Press Release, Long Island Power Authority, LIPA and KeySpan Announce Second Plan for New Generation (July 12, 2001), at http://www.lipower.org/
newscenter/pr/2001/julyl2_01.htm (explaining the proposal to construct two new combustion turbines fueled by natural gas); see also LONG ISLAND POWER AUTHORITY,

(Nov. 13, 2001), at http:/
/www.lipower.org/pdfs/EA/Global%20EA.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (providing
project description and project-wide Environmental Assessment of five proposed
facilities).
32. Elissa Gootman, ProposedMini-PlantsAre Partof a Long-Term Energy Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at D6.
33. Press Release, Long Island Power Authority., LIPA Announces Five New
Turbine Generators for Shoreham, Brentwood and Bethpage (Oct. 18, 2001), at http:/!
www.lipower.org/newsenter/pr/2001/octl8-Ol.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
COMBUSTION TURBINE PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
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tive declaration, fast tracking the turbines which are set to move
forward subject to DEC approval. 34 The LIPA turbine proposal
and the ability to avoid Article X review shows the true implications of PASNY's actions on energy policy in New York.
III.

SEQRA Review of the Siting of the Electric Generators

The Siting Board's determination that Article X did not apply
to PASNY's dual turbine sites in Brooklyn, Bronx and Queens
triggered the environmental review provisions under SEQRA. 35
SEQRA requires state agencies to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts of their actions, and to consider alternatives. 36
The intent of the environmental impact statement ("EIS") process
is for government decision makers to have all of the relevant and
necessary facts before making decisions on projects that may have
an environmental impact. 37 The statute's aim is that the agency
will have sufficient information at the end of the process to decide
whether to approve the project. 38 If the agency chooses to move
39
forward, it must mitigate those impacts identified.
In this case, PASNY was the lead agency charged with implementing SEQRA. PASNY conducted a single environmental assessment for all six of the turbine sites, with each sites'
characteristics and analysis included as attachments to the main
analysis. The EA concluded that the siting of these turbines was a
Type I action, which the law defines as "those actions and projects
that are more likely to require the preparation of an EIS."40 A

Type I action "carries with it the presumption that it is likely to
have a significant adverse impact on the environment." 41 An
34. Press Release, Long Island Power Authority, LIPA Board Approves Environmental Assessment of Powering LI 2002 Turbine Projects (Nov. 13, 2001), at http:ll
www.lipower.org/newscenter/pr/2001/novl3-01_b.htm; see also Christine Woodside,
Cross-Sound Cable Takes Step Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, § 14LI, at 2.
35. SEQRA review is required for the single turbine sites because these facilities
fall below the Article X 80 MW threshold. See UPROSE v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d
42, 46 (App. Div. 2001); Silvercup Studios, Inc. v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49
(App. Div. 2001). The Siting Board in its decision also explicitly recognizes the applicability of SEQRA. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *11.
36. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0106 (McKinney 2002);
H.O.M.E.S. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (App. Div. 1979).
37. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103(7); WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v.
Planning Bd., 568 N.Y.S.2d 974 (App. Div. 1991).
38. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103(7); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
6, § 617.11(d) (2002).
39. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0109(8).
40. N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 617.4(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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agency can rebut this presumption if the record "show[s] that it
identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a
'hard look' at them and made a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis
42
for its determination."
SEQRA regulations require the lead agency to "thoroughly
analyze the identified relevant areas of environmental concern to
determine if the action may have a significant adverse impact on
the environment," and provide a "reasoned elaboration" of its conclusions. 43 The threshold for a full environmental review is very
low, requiring only "the potential for at least one significant adverse environmental impact" for the lead agency to issue a "positive declaration," and prepare a full EIS.4 4 PASNY concluded that
there were no significant environmental impacts, and issued a
negative declaration or "neg. dec." which effectively ended the substantive environmental review process.4 5 Upon review of
PASNYs EA, the court concluded that a full Environmental Im46
pact Statement was required.
Community groups raised many substantive environmental
issues regarding the siting of the turbines. The issues raised include particulate matter, noise, and the impact of the project on
community character. The groups alleged that the EA failed to
address whether the turbines would release air pollution called
particulate matter of 2.5 microns or less ("PM 2.5"), which are fine
soot particles that when inhaled are linked to health problems,
including asthma and premature death, into the communities surrounding these facilities. Particulate matter is recognized as a
non-threshold pollutant, meaning that any ambient concentration
may cause adverse health threats. 4 7 This fact raises a significant
enough environmental and public health issue to warrant full en42. H.O.M.E.S., 418 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
43. N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(b)(3)-(4) (2002).
44. Id. § 617.7(a)(1) (emphasis added).
45. PASNY EAF, supra note 6, at 1-2. The negative declaration applies to the
SEQRA review of all of the proposed gas turbines. Id. The power plant proposed for
Staten Island originally received a positive declaration, but subsequently was withdrawn from consideration as a power plant location.
46. See UPROSE, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (concluding that in light of the "potential
adverse health effects that can result from PM 2.5 emissions," NYPA failed to take
the requisite "hard look"); see also Silvercup Studios, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 49-50 (ruling
the Supreme Court properly annulled the neg. dec. and required preparation of a full
EIS because EAF revealed several areas of potentially significant environmental
impact).
47. See UPROSE, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 45 (defining non-threshold pollutant as having
some possibility of causing an adverse health impact at any concentration).
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vironmental review. On this issue the Court concluded that
PASNY's analysis of particulate matter "is not sufficiently detailed in the EAF and is not an adequate substitute for addressing
the health impacts of PM 2.5 emissions." 48 The issue is of particular relevance because the turbines are located in neighborhoods
that have some of the highest asthma hospitalization rates in the
49
world.
Community residents also commented on noise impacts.
They alleged that the noise coming from the fully operating facility exceeded city noise limitations. 50 They also alleged that the
EA was based upon testing methods that can overestimate background noise levels. Noise can have an adverse impact on people
living or working near the turbines. Increased noise levels can
have a range of adverse impacts on people, including stress, illness, sleep deprivation, and interference with learning.
The EA analysis stated that the turbine buildings would be
similar to existing neighborhood buildings, and therefore, were
consistent with the existing uses. 51 The turbines are located in
minority communities that are in the process of reclaiming their
waterfront areas. The PASNY analysis effectively concluded that
since these communities are industrial in character, no industrial
project could negatively affect the neighborhoods. This conclusory
assertion is not based on any analysis of the actual impact on the
communities. Additionally, the sites are located next to parks and

48. See id. at 46.
49. See Kenneth M. McConnochie et al., Socioeconomic Variation in Asthma Hospitalization: Excess Utilization or Greater Need?, 103 PEDIATRICS e75 (1999), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/103/6/e75 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003)
(noting that the high incidence of severe asthma among inner-city children is attributable in part to adverse environmental conditions); see also CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,
Top NEW YORK COUNTIES SUFFERING THE GREATEST PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACTS DUE TO
POWER PLANT PARTICULATE EMISSIONS (2000) (figure provided by the American Lung
Association, Brooklyn); NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF HEALTH, ASTHMA FACTS, fig. 5, at 5
(1999) available at http://www.asthma-nyc.org/publications/AsthmaFacts.pdf (indi-

cating higher rates of asthma hospitalization in NYC's poor neighborhoods).
50. PASNY acknowledged technical violations of city noise ordinances. PASNY
EAF, supra note 6, at S-18, D-24 to D-27; see also NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CEPO-CEQR NOISE ExPosuRE STANDARDS §§ 42-20 &
42-21 (1993) (stating that "any new activity shall not increase the ambient noise level
by 3 dBA or more.").

51. PASNY EAF, supra note 6, at C-10.
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schools. 52 PASNY eventually added a brief Environmental Jus53
tice section to the EA, after the sites were approved.
In the Siting Board's decision to 'exempt' the dual turbine installation sites from the requirements of Article X, it suggested at
a minimum that the siting of these facilities would require a
SEQRA review. 54 SEQRA requires the applicant to make a "demonstration that the facility will satisfy electric generating capacity
needs."5 5 This showing would have answered many questions
that still remain regarding whether there was a need for these
turbines. However, the PASNY neg. dec. ended the review process
at the Environmental Assessment stage, and allowed PASNY to
avoid showing electric capacity 'need,' and thereby precluded a full
and substantive environmental impact review.
IV.

Energy Need, California and New York's Rationale for
Fast Tracking the NYPA Turbines

PASNY cited the PSC's letter of an "urgent and compelling
need" for additional electric generating capacity to justify, in part,
the installation of the turbines in New York City. 56 The additional electricity capacity, the PSC argued, was required for the
City to meet the New York Independent Systems Operator's ("NYISO") 80% locational capacity requirement. 5 7 NYISO is a private
organization that was created in New York after deregulation to
monitor electricity sales, prices, needs, and electricity distribution
in the State.
The locational requirements in New York City are in place
because of congestion, or 'bottlenecking' in the electricity supply
52. See Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State
to Site Gas Turbine Generatorsin the City of New York: HearingBefore the Assembly
Standing Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities &
Comm'ns, & Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation, 224th Leg. (N.Y.
2001) (testimony of Michael D. Zarin, Esq., Attorney, Zarin and Steinmetz, & Elizabeth C. Yeampierre, Executive Director, UPROSE).

53. Id. (testimony of New York Power Authority).
54. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *11.
55. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2)(h) (McKinney 2002).
56. See Tarler Letter, supra note 9, at 1. There were similar predictions for sum-

mer of 2000. On May 22, 2000, the NYISO concluded that in-city generation capacity
would be short by approximately 300 MW. N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, LOCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS STUDY COVERING THE NEW YORK CONTROL AREA FOR THE 2000-2001
CAPABILITY YEAR 7 (2000), available at http://www.nyiso.com/services/documents/

planning/pdf/locational reqmts-study-master-rev5.pdf [hereinafter

NYISO LOCA-

TIONAL REQUIREMENTS STUDY].

57. See Tarler Letter, supra note 9, at 1; NYISO LOCATIONAL
STUDY, supra note 57, at 3, 7.
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grid that restricts the transmission of upstate and out of state
generated electricity to the City. The resulting shortage can increase the City's susceptibility to power outages. In response, NYISO requires the City to have the ability to generate 80% of its
electric needs in-city. 58 In 2001, the 80% requirement translated
into a need for 8,427 MW of in-city generation. 59 This projection
was based upon the PSC's finding that the summer 2000's capacity requirement was 8,272 MW, plus a 1.5% (155 MW) projected
demand increase in 2001, yielding a 2001 Summer Capacity Re60
quirement ("2001 SCR") of 8,427 MW.
Several questions were raised regarding the accuracy of the
PSC assertion that an additional 315 MW were needed. Environmental advocates pointed out that several generating sources that
were to be available in summer 2001 were not included by the
PSC in its October 2000 electricity needs analysis. These uncounted, but available generating sources, totaled up to 527 MW
of in-city capacity.6 1 As advocates pointed out and available documents showed, the additional unaccounted capacity erased the
315 MW deficit, resulting in a surplus of up to 212 MW of in-city
generation capacity for the summer of 2001. The conflicting numbers offered by different sources underscores the difficulty in forecasting electric generating capacity needs, and raises questions
about the adequacy of the analysis that the PSC relied upon. This
is not to say that all of these facilities would have been online or
that there was no need for concern. However, it appeared that the
PSC may not have been as thorough in its analysis as it could
58. NYISO LOCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS STUDY, supra note 57, at 3, 7.

59. Id.
60. See id. at 7. (indicating 155 MW figure derived from taking 1.5% of the PSC
estimate for the summer 2001 MW load of 10,340); see also Tarler Letter, supra note
9, at 1 (indicating that "electric load growth in the City will continue to increase by at
least 1.5% per year."); ENERGY COMMITTEE, NEW YORK BUILDING CONGRESS, A MATTER
OF URGENCY: NEW YORK CITY'S ELECTRIC SUPPLY NEEDS 14 (2001) (using the 8,272
MW figure).
61. Affidavit of Ashok Gupta in support of Verified Petition
2, 6, 25, 27, 29, 32,
UPROSE v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div. 2001). The additional generating capacity comes from the following currently available facilities: Astoria at 170
MW, an increased capacity of existing sources at 157 MW, a Key Span site at 40 MW
and Linden Cogeneration at 70 MW; other sites available by June 2001: ConEd Unit
10 at 60 MW and increased capacity of ConEd Gowanus at 30 MW, totaling 527 MW.
The analysis is based, in part, upon Natural Resources Defense Council Senior Energy Economist Ashok Gupta's review and analysis of publicly available documents on
generating capacity in New York City in preparation for litigation against NYPA. It
is important to note that Mr. Gupta's analysis is the only detailed analysis specifically
looking at the PSC's claimed 315 MW deficiency. The PSC and NYPA have produced
no equivalent analysis, but would be required to do so under SEQRA.
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have been. Subsequent studies from NYISO and the PSC confirm
the apprehension on this point.
The question regarding how much electricity capacity was
needed for summer 2001 was further complicated by other electricity initiatives. The amended System Benefits Charge ("SBC")
for utilities has provided a monetary incentive for efficiency. Beginning in 2001, the PSC increased overall SBC funding from
$78.1 million to $150 million. 62 This funding caused a decreased
energy demand, which was not factored into the original PSC
needs analysis. As the PSC stated in its order, "[allong with the
newly added $10 million set aside program, these intensive peak
load reduction programs and the other energy saving programs of
the extended five-year program are expected to substantially reduce demand by the summers of 2001 and 2002."63 The New York

State Energy Research and Development Authority ("NYSERDA")
projected that SBC programs would "result in peak demand reduction of 250 - 300 MW by summer 2001," and the entire project is

"projected to reduce peak demand by nearly 1,300 MW by 2006."64

In addition to the SBC changes, NYISO is considering a Demand Response Program that would pay large customers and suppliers who could aggregate their customers in order to scale back
electricity demand at peak times. 65 The program would provide a
tremendous financial incentive to reduce electricity use, and
would also result in decreased electricity needs during peak load
times in summer 2001.
PASNY spent over $510 million to purchase the ten turbines
from General Electric. 66 PASNY stated that it had sufficient re62. In re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, Order Continuing and Expanding the System Benefits Charge for Public Benefit Programs, N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 94-E-0952, 2001 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 77, at *22-23 (Jan. 26,
2001).
63. Id. at *39. The issue here is whether the PSC forecasters had knowledge of
the proposed changes to the SBC, and how those changes would impact electricity
need forecasts.
64. NEW YORK STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SYSTEMS
BENEFITS CHARGE: PROPOSED OPERATING PLAN FOR NEW YORK ENERGY $SMART PROGRAMS (2001-2006) 2 (2002), available at http://www.nyserda.org/sbc200l-2006.pdf
(last visited Feb. 4, 2003) [hereinafter NYSERDA, SYSTEM BENEFITS CHARGE].
65. See NEENAN ASSOCIATES L.L.C., NYISO PRL PROGRAM EVALUATION: ExEcuTIVE SUMMARY E-2 to E-3 (2002), available at http://www.nyiso.com/services/documents/groups/bic-price-responsive-wg/demand-response/evaluation/exec-summaryfinal.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).

66. Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State to
Site Gas Turbine Generators in the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly
Standing Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities &
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sources on hand to make this purchase, and the deal would not
cause tax increases, or loss of services from the agency. The price
is significant because experts have conservatively estimated that
a 1 MW reduction can be reached for each $1 million spent in electricity conservation efforts. 6 7 There are also environmental and
public health benefits from reduced electricity consumption because the pollution caused by its generation is decreased. 6 Removing, reducing or eliminating the need for electricity where
possible is the environmentally responsible long-term solution for
New York because that electricity, and the pollution caused by its
generation will no longer be necessary.
PASNY took a considerable concerted effort to install the turbines and have them operational by June 1, 2001. Public statements illustrated the "immediate action" mode of the agency on
this project. PASNY created the impression that New York was
on the verge of an energy crisis like California's, where "rolling
blackouts" had significant impacts on the state. PASNY recently
stated in its public comments on a lawsuit brought by environmental and public interest groups challenging PASNY's siting decisions that "lelvery day's delay ...will push New York City one
day closer to California". 69 The publicly available record shows
that the agency's allegations that New York was about to enter a
California-style energy crisis were without merit.
V.

The California Comparison Was Unwarranted

In 2001, New York did not have problems similar to those
that struck California. This is because of electricity. system differences with California, such as electric generating capacity reserve
requirements, in-state generating capacity, and market strucComm'ns, & Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation,224th Leg. 184 (N.Y.
2001) (testimony of Eugene W. Zeltmann, President, PASNY), available at http:/!
www.nypa.gov/interest/10322a.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2003); see also N.Y. Power
Auth., Power Now! Generators, at http://www.nypa.gov/PowerNow/pn.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2003) (indicating $5,000,000 per unit was spent to "equip the plants with
the most advanced technology available for controlling pollution and reducing
noise.").
67. NYSERDA, SYSTEM BENEFITS CHARGE, supra note 65, at 21.
68. Id. at 3 (noting "programs from 2001 through 2006 electric savings of 13,000
GWh and emissions reductions of approximately 10,000 tons of NO., 20,000 tons of
SO 2 and nearly 6.0 million tons of CO2 ..").
69. Kirk Johnson, Critics of Power GeneratorsSue, Citing Threat to Environment,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at B4.
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ture. 70 As William Museler, head of the New York Independent
System Operator stated, "California's electricity market is designed and operates in a materially different way from New York's
market . . . we need to be very careful not to draw generalized
71
conclusions and impose quick fixes."

New York's installed reserve requirement is a NYISO 'margin
of error' established annually to ensure there is adequate electric72
ity in case of forced outages, deratings, and capacity/load relief.
The installed reserve requirement is 18%, which translates to an
approximate 5,000 MW cushion, or supply surplus available under
peak demand. 73 California does not have such a requirement.
New York's peak demand was expected to be 30,200 MW in
2001, but the State had the capacity to generate over 35,636
MW.7 4 In addition to the generating capacity currently available
to the City, the installed reserve requirement will further be eased
by the 5,547 MW capacity currently moving through the Article X
process. 75 Several years must pass and a significant increase in
70. California electricity demand has increased by 2-3% a year for the past several years but supply has not kept pace. Between 1996-1999 California's growing
economy caused peak period demand to increase by over 5,500 MW. California's rate
of increase is considerably higher than current increases in New York. New York's
demand for electricity has been rising about 1.5% a year, and the amount of electricity
demand for next year is still well beneath the state's electricity generation capability.
See MICHAEL KAHN & LORETTA LYNCH, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES: REPORT TO GOVERNOR GRAY DAVIS, available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/pub-

lished/report/GovReport.htm#TopofPage (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
71. NYISO Responds to PSC Market Examination, 2 CURRENTLY .. INSIGHT FOR
MARKET PARTICIPANTS 1 (2001) availableat http://www.nyiso.comlservices/documents/
newsletters/pdf/currently_vol2noljan.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
72. See ANJALI SHEFFRIN, DEVELOPING AN EFFICIENT CA MARKET-CoMPARISON
OF OTHER US ISOs (2000), available at http://www.caiso.com/docs/O9003a6O8O/O5/a8/
09003a608005a8c8.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003); see also NEW YORK INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, NYISO INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL,

OVERVIEW OF INSTALLED CAPACITY

PLANNING AND PROCUREMENT PROCESS (2001), availableat http://www.nyiso.com/mar-

kets/icap-auctions/icap-manual-nov-01/2_stage_2-icap-nov_2001.pdf
(last visited
Feb. 4, 2003).
73. NYISO LOCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS STUDY, supra note 57, at 3. Imported electricity can count as part of the reserve margin. Currently that level is set at 3165

MW.
74. David Robinson, Electricity-Will There Be Enough?, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 21,
2001, at 1A.
75. See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., ARTICLE X CASES, at http://www.
dps.state.ny.us/xtable.PDF (revised Dec. 31, 2002). Pending applications include Astoria Energy, LLC, Astoria Queens totaling 1000 MW (estimated in-service date
2004); East River Repowering, Lower Manhattan totaling 360 MW (estimated in-service date 2002); Poletti Station Expansion, Astoria Queens totaling 500 MW (estimated in-service date 2004); Ravenswood Cogeneration Project, Long Island City,

Queens totaling 250 MW (estimated in-service date 2004); and Sunset Energy Fleet
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demand must occur before an electric generating capacity
shortage similar to California's could develop in New York. Overall, New York generates more than enough electricity in state.
The total amount of in-state generation will increase as more
power plants come online in the next few years.7 6 This does not
include the agreements that New York has established with the
surrounding electricity market. Even with the increased demand
in 2001, New York did not run out of electricity supply, contrary to
the assertions of the PSC, PASNY and NYISO. New York imports
only 10% of the electricity it consumes. New York has also made
several contingent arrangements with out-of-state suppliers,
should New York's electricity import needs increase above the cur77
rent 10% import level.
There are also market differences that separate New York
and California. Currently, California has a retail price cap that is
much lower. There is no equivalent in New York. 78 The California cap resulted in losses for utilities because they could not pass
the increases onto consumers, regardless of how high the wholesale market price went. To further exacerbate the impact of this
system, California prohibits utilities from reaching long-term electric supply contracts in favor of purchasing electricity on the spot
market where prices can shift dramatically. The unintended consequences of the price cap and spot market fluctuation resulted in
California utilities approaching bankruptcy because they are
forced to absorb the increased wholesale prices paid to their electricity suppliers. "The caps prevented the state's utilities from
passing their costs onto ratepayers, creating no incentive for con-

LLC, Brooklyn totaling 520 MW. Preliminary scoping includes Oak Point Energy,
Brooklyn totaling 1075 MW and Orion Power Astoria Repowering Project, Astoria,
Queens totaling 1842 MW. Id.
76. See infra Part V (illustrating the 527 MW of new generating capacity currently in the Article X siting process).
77. See infra Part V. New York has agreements and power arrangements for additional power supply with Hydro-Quebec, Pennsylvania-Maryland-New Jersey Independent System Operator, and New England Independent System Operator. N.Y.S.
RELIABILITY COUNCIL, L.L.C., NEW YORK CONTROL AREA INSTALLED CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PERIOD MAY 2001 THROUGH APRIL 2002: EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
RESOLUTION AND TECHNICAL STUDY REPORT (2000).
78. Power Disruptions, Price Increases, and Customer Issues in New York City
and Westchester: Hearing Before the Assembly Standing Com. on Energy, 223d Leg.
(N.Y. 2000) (testimony of Kevin McGrath, Representative, Consolidated Edison
Solutions).
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sumers to conserve." 7 9 As a result, California's major electricity
suppliers are reluctant to sell electricity to distributing utilities
for fear that they will not be paid. The financial problems at the
California utilities will ensure continued emergency situations.
VI.

Energy Costs and the Flawed Market Structure of
Energy Deregulation

While public statements were made that installing the turbines would avoid California-style blackouts in New York, PASNY
officials clearly indicated price considerations were playing just as
significant a role in the decision making process. In New York,
utility rates had doubled, and in some cases tripled. Consumers
were feeling these increases. As one owner of a small grocery
store indicated, "[a]nd last year's, this gentleman was charged
$11,432.98, and this year for the same period of time, he's charged
$22,398."80 The PASNY turbines were also intended to influence
those market prices. The candid admission amounts to PASNY
getting "back into" the power business after selling such assets as
the Indian Point 3 nuclear generating facility. PASNY admitted
that the turbines would be "bid into the New York ISO on a dayahead basis." 1 ' This is on top of the fact that turbines could be
82
run twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
79. Alex Berenson, Deregulation: A Movement Groping in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2001, § 4, at 6 (quoting Stephen Slifer, Chief American Economist, Lehman
Brothers).
80. Power Disruptions, Price Increases, and Customer Issues in New York City
and Westchester: Hearing before N.Y State Assembly Standing Comm. on Energy,
223d Leg. 207 (N.Y. 2000) (testimony of Nelson Eusebio).
81. Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State to
Site Gas Turbine Generators in the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly
Standing Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities &
Comm'ns, & Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation,224th Leg. 190 (N.Y.
2001) (testimony of New York Power Authority).
82. In a 2001 public hearing on energy issues PASNY President admitted that the
generators would be bid into the market each day, leaving the significant potential
that the generators will be running all the time. As President Zeltmann stated,
"[t]hey [(generators)] are going to be bid in the New York ISO on a day-ahead basis."
Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State to Site Gas
Turbine Generators in the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly Standing
Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities & Comm'ns, &
Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation, 224th Leg. 191 (N.Y. 2001).
To which Assemblyman Richard Brodsky replied, "In other words, you are going
to bid it [power supply from the New York City Turbines] on an every day, every day,
no matter what the capacity, we could be well beneath that next capacity need, no
hint of brownout, no hint of blackout and these generators will run?" Id. (comments of
New York State Assemblyman Richard Brodsky).
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There is little doubt that the ten turbines could provide an
electric supply cushion that the state hoped would offset the tremendous price spikes in tight energy markets. When consumer
energy demand is high and energy supply tight, energy producers
can bid their supply into the market at a much higher price, knowing that their energy will be used because of such a demand. The
reasoning behind increased supply is to provide a cushion and
therefore this competition will lower energy prices. Running the
turbines 24-hours a day, 7-days a week regardless of need would
supply electricity that could lower prices for consumers. PASNY's
calculation, however, did not factor the environmental costs and
the community impacts and disruptions that the siting of these
turbines would cause. The residents of the communities where
the turbines were placed by PASNY, who are already dealing with
heavy industrial pollution and one of the highest asthma rates in
the world, would have to live deal with these costs during continuous operation of the turbines.
Even by increasing the amount of generation within the state,
the current market structure is much to blame for the over-charging and market manipulation that will continue to increase consumer rates. The system of energy bidding is fundamentally
flawed. The state energy system works on the premise of the
'market-clearing price.'8 3 Under this system all energy producers
place bids for electricity they are willing to supply in the dayahead, real-time or both markets. The ISO selects bids from the
generators up to a point where enough generation is available to
meet anticipated demand. When reconciled, suppliers are paid
the 'clearing price' based upon bid price paid. In other words,
when suppliers bid their energy into the system, all energy at the
lowest prices will be taken until the need is fulfilled. However,
fluctuation in supply can alter the balance of the market, allowing
those who charge higher prices for electricity to be purchased because that electricity is needed. Every supplier is paid the market
clearing price, which is the highest bid paid. So some suppliers
can bid their energy at next to nothing and actually get paid what
the highest bidder charged per MW, whether it is $250.00,
$500.00 or $1,000.00.

83. For a thorough review of the energy market rules and policy see NYISO's
Manuals, available at http://www.nyiso.com/services/documents/manuals/index.html
(last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
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Under this structure, market manipulation can and has occurred.8 4 There have been several instances of market manipulation and abuse.8 5 The ISO market structure keeps the abuses
private. As a quasi-public institution, the ISO that is entrusted
with the job of overseeing a fair energy process should but does
not disclose market manipulation to the consumers who are directly affected by such actions. The market clearing price mecha84. See Robert J. Michaels & Jerry Ellig, Energy-Price Spikes by Design?, 22
20 (1999) (commenting that the wholesale electricity market operated
with efficiency and price spikes are not evidence of the need for price controls); William A. Hogan, Electricity Market Restructuring: Reforms of Reforms, (2001), available at http://64.2.134.196/EnergyConf/hogan.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003); Paul L.
Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity
Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSP., 119, 119-38 (1997) (explaining that changes are being
made to encourage competition in the electric industry and to reform regulations and
distribution functions); Scott Harvey et al., Transmission Capacity Reservations Implemented Through a Spot Market With Transmission Congestion Contracts,9 ELEC.
J. 42 (1996) (noting that capacity reservations can be traded and would fully support
the competitive market).
85. See Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State
to Site Gas Turbine Generatorsin the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly
Standing Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities &
Comm'ns, & Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation, 224th Leg. 443-44
(N.Y. 2001):
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: It is my understanding you've identified
around a hundred market manipulations, suspected market
manipulations.
NYISO, William Museler: I'm not familiar with that number, sir. We
have identified instances of abuse of market power which in terms thatAssemblyman Richard Brodsky: Who have you referred those abuses to?
CEO Museler: In the cases where we have authority to take action, we've
taken action. Our action is typically to do one of a number of things. One
is we could change bids; change a generator's bid (from) prospectively going forward. We do not have the authority to retroactively correct prices,
so that's-where we have the authority, we do that, we correct the problem going forward.
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: Could we have a list of those instances?
CEO Museler: We're not, based on the FERC order that we operate under
and the code of conduct that we operate under, we are not allowed to relate that information.
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: May you refer to a law enforcement
agency?
CEO Museler: In certain instances we would have the ability to refer
things to the FTC.
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: Other than the FTC, could you refer to
the Attorney General of the State of New York?
CEO Museler: I am not aware of anything in the regulations or the FERC
orders that we operate under that allow us to do that. .
Id. (emphasis added).
REGULATION
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nism and its susceptibility to market manipulation is part of the
new 'free market' for electricity that consumers are faced with,
and is one without substantial safety nets that ensure that electricity suppliers cannot use market forces to maximize their profits at the expense of consumers.
VII.

Conclusion: A Look Toward the Future

PASNY can and should play a role in achieving price stability
and system reliability in New York's electric market. The California crisis of the past few years has drawn much public attention to
the electricity system in the United States. California has also
illustrated what can go wrong when the state does not adequately
address or prepare for electric generating needs of its residents.
Addressing issues of price and supply, however, require a rational
and open process to develop the best strategy for state residents.
There are environmental and public health implications to how we
choose to deal with the future of our electricity markets. A kneejerk reaction to potential crises justified by questionable analyses
is not in anyone's long-term interests.
The PASNY turbine case was about more than making sure
electricity could be supplied to meet "peak load" requirements.
PASNY made it clear that price considerations also played a role.
In the haste to install and operate the turbines, two major environmental review statutes in state law were effectively by-passed.
The courts heard arguments from community groups that chose to
challenge PASNY's environmental review process. They won.8 6 A
legally valid siting review process may have ultimately allowed
the ten power turbines to be built as proposed. The environmental
review would have provided a statutory mechanism for citizens to
raise concerns, and if significant, have them mitigated. Such statutorily required review was undertaken after the turbines were
sited and constructed. The sites for the turbines are located in
predominately low-income, minority areas, with already high
levels of asthma and other health concerns from numerous environmental facilities. Any price savings or mitigation resulting
from operation of these turbines must be judged in light of the
costs to these communities.
86. See UPROSE v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div. 2001); Silvercup Studios v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that there were deficiencies in the Environmental Assessment, but the nameplate capacity issues were
not part of the decision).
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Deregulation of the electric market has been economically
and environmentally costly for many New Yorkers. As Assemblyman Paul Tonko stated, "(i)t is ironic that three years after the
(Public Service) Commission and Company testified that deregulation would drive down prices and would have no impact on reliability, quite the opposite has happened."87 Electricity needs of
New York is not a problem that will go away by itself. The state
needs a long-term, environmentally sound energy policy, not mass
production of generator facilities without long-term vision or regard for the law. There needs to be public and legislative input
into what this vision will be. New York is not California. Scare
tactics must not be used by government to push through an
agenda fraught with so many adverse effects. It is time to fix this
energy problem once and for all. The health and safety of New
York's residents as well as the preservation of the environment
depend on it.
In addition to the problems of deregulation, the NYPA turbines and the LIPA turbines have significant costs: time and
money. Several hundred million dollars of state money have been
on the "temporary" and expensive operation of electric generating
turbines. Considerable effort and time is being put into their construction and operation. The money and time would be much better spent in reducing electricity demand and by developing
effective conservation programs. NYSERDA believes that current
proposals could have resulted in significant reductions in the
amount of electricity that must be generated to meet our electricity needs. Conservation and reduced consumption strategies also
have considerable environmental and public health savings that
are not easily quantifiable in money terms. New York should
learn one valuable lesson from California: conservation can and
does work, and should be part of a carefully developed strategy for
our future electricity and energy needs.

87. Power DisruptionsPrice Increases, and Customer Issues in New York City and
Westchester: Hearing before N.Y State Assembly Standing Comm. on Energy, 223d
Leg. (N.Y. 2000) (comments of Assemblyman Paul Tonko).
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